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ABSTRACT
A shift in taxes or in government spending (a "fiscal shock") at some point in time puts a constraint
on the path of taxes and spending in the future, since the government intertemporal budget constraint
will eventually have to be met. This simple fact is surprisingly overlooked in analyses of the effects
of fiscal policy based on Vector AutoRegressive models. We study the effects of fiscal shocks keeping
track of the debt dynamics that arises following a fiscal shock, and allowing for the possibility that
taxes, spending and interest rates might respond to the level of the debt, as it evolves over time. We
show that omitting a debt feedback can result in incorrect estimates of the dynamic effects of fiscal
shocks. In particular, the absence of an effect of fiscal shocks on long-term interest rates -- a frequent
finding in studies that omit a debt feedback -- can be explained by their mis-specification. Using data
for the U.S. economy and two alternative identification assumptions we reconsider the effects of fiscal
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A shift in taxes or in government spending (a ”ﬁscal shock”) at some point
in time puts a constraint on the path of taxes and spending in the future,
since the government intertemporal budget constraint will eventually have
to be met. This simple fact is surprisingly overlooked in analyses (at least
those of which we are aware) of the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy based on Vector
AutoRegressive models.
Consider for example a positive shock to government spending. Following
the shock the government may respect its budget constraint by adjusting
taxes and spending so as to keep the ratio of public debt-to-GDP stable, or
it may delay the adjustment and in the meantime let the debt ratio grow.
I tm a ye v e np l a nt ou s et h ei n ﬂation tax or to default. The eﬀects of the
ﬁscal shock on taxes, spending, inﬂation and interest rates are likely to diﬀer
depending on the path the government chooses.
Another way to put this is that the Vector AutoRegressive models that
are typically used to estimate the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks on various macroe-
conomic variables (such as output and private consumption) share two weak-
nesses: (i) they fail to keep track of the debt dynamics that arises following
a ﬁscal shock, and (ii) as the debt ratio evolves over time they overlook the
possibility that taxes and spending might respond to the level of the debt.
In other words, following a ﬁscal shock, taxes and spending are assumed to
respond to various macroeconomic variables but not to the level of the public
debt. This omission is particularly surprising in the case of countries where
the data reveal a positive correlation between the government surplus-to-
GDP ratio and the government debt-to-GDP ratio and thus indicate that
ﬁscal variables respond to the level of the debt. Bohn (1998) ﬁnds such a
correlation in a century of U.S. data.
The consequence of omitting a feedback from the debt level is that the
error terms in the equations that are estimated include, along with truly ex-
ogenous ﬁscal shocks, the responses of taxes, government spending and other
variables–such as (importantly) long term interest rates–to the level of the
debt ratio along the path induced by the ﬁscal shock. The coeﬃcients that
are estimated and then used to compute impulse responses are thus typically
biased. An eﬀect of such a bias is that impulse responses are sometimes
computed along unstable debt paths, i.e. paths along which the debt-to-
GDP ratio diverges. The omission of a feedback from the level of the debt to
1long-term interest rates, combined with the failure to keep track of the debt
dynamics, could also be the reason why in some experiments interest rates
do not appear to respond signiﬁcantly to ﬁscal shocks.
One could argue that omitting the level of the debt is not a problem be-
cause the Vector AutoRegressive models that are typically estimated already
include all the variables that enter the government intertemporal budget
constraint and thus determine the evolution of the debt over time: what is
missing is at most an initial value for the debt level. We show that is would
not be enough: failure to explicitly include the debt level in the estimated
equation–and keep track of its path when computing impulse responses–
c a nr e s u l ti nb i a s e de s t i m a t e so ft h ee ﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks on macro
variables.
The point we make sheds light on a common empirical ﬁnding: the eﬀects
of ﬁscal shocks seem to change across time. For instance, Perotti (2007) ﬁnds
that the eﬀect on U.S. consumption of an increase in government spending
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in the 1960’s and 1970’s, but became
insigniﬁcant in the 1980’s and 1990’s. We ﬁnd a sharp diﬀerence in the
way U.S. ﬁscal authorities responded to the accumulation of debt in the
two samples: since the early 1980’s, following a shock to spending or taxes,
both ﬁscal policy instruments are adjusted over time in order to stabilize
the debt ratio. This does not appear to have happened in the 1960’s and
1970’s, when there is no evidence of a stabilizing response of ﬁscal policy.
This evidence can explain the heterogeneity of impulse responses to ﬁscal
shocks in the pre-1980 and the post-1980 samples for two reasons. First, the
dynamic behavior of taxes and spending following a ﬁscal shock depends on
the importance of the debt stabilization motive in the ﬁscal reaction function.
Second, it should not be surprising that consumers respond diﬀerently to an
innovation in taxes or government spending depending on whether or not
they expect the government to meet its intertemporal budget constraint by
adjusting taxes and/or spending in the future.
Our ﬁndings are also related to the evidence of a non-linearity in the re-
sponse of private consumption to ﬁscal shocks–documented among others
by Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) for a group of OECD countries.
Romer and Romer (2007) also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of a U.S. tax shock on
output depends on whether the change in taxes is motivated by the gov-
ernment’s desire to stabilize the debt, or is unrelated to the stance of ﬁscal
policy.
2The point we make is independent of the assumption adopted to iden-
tify ﬁscal shocks—whether imposing enough constraints on a Structural VAR
(such as in Blanchard and Perotti, 2002 or Mountford and Uhlig, 2002) or
identifying shocks from the narrative record, as Ramey (2006), or in Romer
and Romer (2007). This paper is agnostic as to the best strategy to identify
ﬁscal shocks: we experiment with alternative identiﬁcation approaches and
document the importance of omitting the debt-deﬁcits dynamics in all cases.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we explain why estimating
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks omitting the response of taxes and spending
to the level of the public debt is problematic. Section 3 describes our data. In
Sections 4 and 5 we evaluate the empirical relevance of our point computing
impulse responses to ﬁscal shocks in models in which the variables are allowed
to respond to the level of the debt—whose evolution over time is determined
by the intertemporal government budget constraint. We then compare these
impulse responses with those obtained from models that omit the debt level.
In Section 4 we use the identiﬁcation technique proposed by Blanchard and
Perotti (2002). In Section 5 we use the tax shocks identiﬁed by Romer and
Romer (2007).
We close by observing that the methodology described in this paper to
analyze the impact of ﬁscal shocks by taking into account the stock-ﬂow
relationship between debt and ﬁscal variables could be applied to other dy-
namic models which include similar identities. One example are the recent
discussions on the importance of including capital as a slow-moving variable
to capture the relation between productivity shocks and hours worked (see
e.g. Christiano et al, 2005 and Chari et al. 2005).
2W h y s t a n d a r d ﬁscal policy VAR’s are mis-
speciﬁed
The study of the dynamic response of macroeconomic variables to shifts in





CiYt−i + ut (1)
3where Y includes government spending, taxes, output and other macroe-
conomic variables such as interest rates, consumption and inﬂation.
The level of the debt-to-GDP-ratio is never included in (1). This variable,
however, is an important factor in determining the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy for
two reasons (at least):
• a feedback from the level of debt ratio to taxes and government spend-
ing is necessary for stability of the debt, unless the rate of growth of
the economy is exactly equal to the average cost of ﬁnancing the debt.
Such a feedback is a feature of the data: Bohn (1998) ﬁnds that a cen-
tury of U.S. data reveal a positive correlation between the government
surplus-to-GDP ratio and the government debt-to-GDP ratio;
• interest rates, a central variable in the transmission of ﬁscal shocks,
depend on future expected monetary policy and on the risk premium:
both may be aﬀected by the debt dynamics—for instance if a growing
stock of debt raises fears of future monetization or, in the extreme case,
of debt default. The impact of a given ﬁscal shock on interest rates will
be very diﬀerent depending on whether the shock produces a path of
debt that is stable or tends to become explosive.
If the level of the debt ratio is signiﬁcant in explaining at least some
of the variables included in (1), omitting it implies that the error terms u
will include, along with truly exogenous shocks, the responses of Y,a n di n
particular of taxes, spending and interest rates, to the level of the debt: this
will result in biased estimates of the Ci coeﬃcients. The analysis of the
eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks using (1) can thus be problematic.
Once the level of the debt ratio is included in (1), one must allow for
t h ef a c tt h a tt a x e s ,g o v e r n m e n ts p e n d i n g ,o u t p u t ,i n ﬂation and the rate of
interest—in other words the variables entering Y—are linked by an identity,
the equation that determines how the debt ratio evolves over time. These
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¤
.dis the debt-to-GDP ratio, i is the
nominal rate of interest (the average cost of debt ﬁnancing), ∆y is real GDP
growth, ∆p is inﬂation, t and g are, respectively, (the logs of) government
revenues and government expenditure net of interest. (We use logs because
it is the log of output, taxes and spending that enters Y). Note that the
presence of dt−i ampliﬁes the dynamic eﬀect of ﬁscal shocks, which cumulate
in (2), while they do not in (1): the diﬀerence between impulse responses
computed using (2) and (1) might thus diverge as the horizon increases.
Before discussing how ﬁscal policy shocks can be studied in the context
of (2) we pause and ask a question. Y already contains all the variables that
enter the government intertemporal budget constraint in (2): isn’t this good
enough ? Do we need to insert the debt level directly? Why are the impulse
responses biased if the model does not explicitly include d and the identity
describing debt accumulation? The reason why d cannot be dropped is that
it is unlikely that the short lags of g, t, ∆p, ∆y and i that enter (linearly)
(1) can trace the evolution of the debt ratio accurately enough. To convince






















But the best way to convince the reader is to show that impulse responses
computed using (2) diﬀer from those computed using (1) and produce dif-
ferent paths for dt. We show this using U.S. data and two diﬀerent ways to
identify ﬁscal shocks, that are representatives of alternative paths researchers
have followed (in this paper we remain agnostic as to the preferred identi-
ﬁcation strategy): the technique proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
and the ”exogenous” tax shocks identiﬁed by Romer and Romer (2007) with
a narrative approach. We start by describing our data.
53 The data
We begin using quarterly data for the U.S. economy since 1960:1, the sample
analyzed in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and extended to 2005:4 in Perotti
(2007). Our approach requires that the debt-dynamics equation in (2) tracks
the path of dt accurately: we thus need to deﬁne the variables in this equation
with some care.
T h es o u r c ef o rt h ed i ﬀerent components of the budget deﬁc i ta n df o ra l l
macroeconomic variables are the NIPA accounts (available on the Bureau of
Economic Analysis website, downloaded on December 7th 2006). yt is (the
log of) real GDP per capita, ∆pt is the log diﬀerence of the GDP deﬂa-
tor. Data for the stock of U.S. public debt and for population are from the
FRED database (available on the Federal Reserve of St.Louis website,also
downloaded on December 7th 2006). Our measure for gt is (the log of)
real per capita primary government expenditure: nominal expenditure is ob-
tained subtracting from total Federal Government Current Expenditure (line
39, NIPA Table 3.2 ) net interest payments at annual rates (obtained as the
diﬀerence between line 28 and line 13 on the same table). Real per capita
expenditure is then obtained by dividing the nominal variable by population
times the GDP chain deﬂator. Our measure for tt is (the log of) real per
capita government receipts at annual rates (the nominal variable is reported
on line 36 of the same NIPA Table).
The average cost servicing the debt, it, is obtained by dividing net interest
payments by the federal government debt held by the public (FYGFDPUN
in the Fred database) at time t − 1. The federal government debt held
by the public is smaller than the gross federal debt, which is the broadest
deﬁnition of the U.S. public debt. However, not all gross debt represents
past borrowing in the credit markets since a portion of the gross federal
debt is held by trust funds—primarily the Social Security Trust Fund, but
also other funds: the Trust Fund for Unemployment Insurance, the Highway
Trust Fund, the pension fund of federal employees, etc.. The assets held by
these funds consist of non-marketable debt.1 We thus exclude it from our
deﬁnition of federal public debt.
Figure 1 reports, starting in 1970:1 (the ﬁrst quarter for which the debt
data are available in FRED), this measure of the debt held by the public as
1Cashell (2006) notes that ”this debt exists only as a book-keeping entry, and does not
reﬂect past borrowing in credit markets.”
6a fraction of GDP (this is the dotted line). We have checked the accuracy
of the debt dynamics equation in (2) simulating it forward from 1970:1 (this
is the continuous line in Figure 1). The simulated series is virtually super-
imposed to the actual one: the small diﬀerences are due to approximation
errors in computing inﬂation and growth rates as logarithmic diﬀerences, and
to the fact that the simulated series are obtained by using seasonally adjusted
measures of expenditures and revenues. Based on this evidence we have used
the debt dynamics equation to extend dt back to 1950:1. (A quarterly series
for dt extending back to 1950:1 will become necessary when we compare our
results with those in Romer and Romer (2007) whose sample starts just after
World War II.) Figure 1 shows that this series tracks the annual debt level
accurately, at least up to the early 1950’s. 2
4 Fiscal shocks identiﬁed from SVAR’s
We start by comparing (2) with the Structural VAR (SVAR) estimated in
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and extended in Perotti (2007) (B&P in what
follows).
SVAR’s identify ﬁscal shocks imposing restrictions that allow the two
structural ﬁscal shocks in (1) to be recovered from the reduced form resid-




t, contain three terms: (i) the response of taxes
and government spending to ﬂuctuations in macroeconomic variables, such
as output and inﬂation, that is implied by the presence of automatic stabiliz-
ers; (ii) the discretionary response of ﬁscal policy to news in macro variables
and (iii) truly exogenous shifts in taxes and spending, the shocks we wish to
identify. B&P exploit the fact that it typically takes longer than a quarter
for discretionary ﬁscal policy to respond to news in macroeconomic variables:
at quarterly frequency the contemporaneous discretionary response of ﬁscal
policy to macroeconomic data can thus be assumed to be zero. To identify
the component of u
g
t and ut
t which corresponds to automatic stabilizers they
use institutional information on the elasticities of tax revenues and govern-
ment spending to macroeconomic variables. They thus identify the structural
2We are unable to build the debt series back to 1947:1, the start of the Romer and
Romer sample, because data for total governemnt spending, needed to buld the debt series,
are available on a consistent basis only from 1950:1.
7shocks to g and t by imposing on the A and B matrices in Au = Be the
following structure 3:
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
10 agy ag∆p agi
01 aty at∆p ati
a31 a32 100
a41 a42 a43 10
a51 a52 a53 a54 1
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
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where ei
t (i =1 ,2,3) are non-ﬁscal shocks and have no structural inter-
pretation. Since agy,a g∆p,a gi,a ty,a t∆p and ati are identiﬁed using external
information 4, there are only 15 parameters to be estimated. As there are
also 15 diﬀerent elements in the variance-covariance matrix of the 5-equation
VAR innovations, the model is just identiﬁed. The ei
t (i =1 ,2,3) are de-
rived by imposing a recursive scheme on the bottom three rows of A and
B; however, the identiﬁcation of the two ﬁscal shocks—the only ones that we
shall use to compute impulse responses—is independent of this assumption.
Finally, the identiﬁcation assumption imposes b12 =0 . 5
Although we use the same identifying assumptions, our choice of variables
diﬀers slightly from those used in B&P, because, as discussed above, we
need to use variables that allow the debt dynamics equation to track the
path of dt accurately. In particular, our measure of i is the average cost of
debt ﬁnancing rather than the yield to maturity on long-term government
3Mountford and Uhlig (2002) identify government spending and revenue shocks by
imposing restrictions on the sign of impulse responses. Fatas and Mihov (2001) rely on a
simple Choleski ordering.
4The elasticities of taxes and government spending with respect to output, inﬂation
and interest rates used in the identiﬁcation have been updated in Perotti (2007) and are
Elasticities of government revenues and expenditures
agy ag∆p agi aty at∆p ati
Entire sample 0 -0.5 0 1.85 1.25 0
1960:1-1979:4 0 -0.5 0 1.75 1.09 0
1980:1-2006:2 0 -0.5 0 1.97 1.40 0
5B&P provide robustness checks for this assumption by setting b21 = 0 and estimating
b12. We have also experimented with this alternative option. In practice, as the top left
corner of the B matrix is not statistically diﬀerent from a diagonal matrix, the assumption
b12 = 0 is irrelevant to determine the shape of impulse response functions.
8b o n d su s e di nB & P .O u rd e ﬁnitions of g and t are also slightly diﬀerent: we
follow the NIPA deﬁnitions by considering net transfers as part of government
expenditure, rather than subtracting them from taxes.
To check that our slight diﬀerences in data deﬁnitions do not change the
results we have ﬁrst estimated (1) as in B&P. Following Perotti (2007) who
ﬁnds diﬀerences in the impulse response functions before and after 1980, the
sample is split in two sub-samples 1960:1-1979:4 and 1980:1-2006:2. The
i m p u l s er e s p o n s e sa r er e p o r t e di nF i g u r e sA 1a n dA 2i nt h eA p p e n d i xa n d
are consistent with those reported in B&P. In particular:
• an (exogenous) increase in public expenditure has an expansionary ef-
fect on output, while an (exogenous) increase in revenues is contrac-
tionary. The impact of ﬁscal policy weakens in the second sub-sample,
in particular the eﬀects of tax shocks become insigniﬁcant;
• after 1980 ﬁscal shocks become less persistent;
• the eﬀect of ﬁscal shocks on interest rates is insigniﬁcant in the ﬁrst sub-
sample; it is small, signiﬁcant but counterintuitive in the second sub-
sample when an increase in public spending lowers the cost of servicing
the debt;
• ﬁscal shocks have consistently no signiﬁcant eﬀect on inﬂation.
4.1 The debt dynamics implied by a standard SVAR
To assess the importance of omitting d, we start with a simple exercise. After
having estimated the parameters Ci in (1) we use the identity which describes
debt accumulation to simulate the system out-sample for 80 quarters starting
from the conditions prevailing in the last observation of the estimation period.
The path for dt so constructed reveals the steady state properties of the
estimated empirical model.
When (1) is estimated over the ﬁrst sub-sample (1960:1-1979:4) the sim-
ulated out-of-sample path for dt diverges (Figure 2). When (1) is estimated
over the second sub-sample (1980:1-2006:2) the simulated debt ratio tends,
eventually, to fall below zero.
This exercise naturally raises a number of questions:
9• does the apparent instability depend on the underlying behavior of the
government, or is it simply the result of a mis-speciﬁed model? Debt
stabilization requires that the primary budget surplus reacts to the
accumulation of debt, but such a reaction—if it were in the data—would
not be captured by (1). Hence the simulated path may very well be
the result of a mis-speciﬁcation of the empirical model rather than a
description of the actual behavior of the government;
• it is obviously diﬃcult to interpret impulse response functions when
they are computed along unstable paths for the debt ratio, as they
would eventually diverge. An unstable dynamics becomes particularly
problematic when the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks are computed over rela-
tively long horizons, or when identiﬁcation is obtained imposing long
run restrictions on the shape of impulse responses. This is not the case
in the B&P identiﬁcation, that is achieved imposing restrictions on the
simultaneous eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks. However, the interpreta-
tion of the responses to shocks along an unstable debt path remains
problematic;
• impulse response functions appear to diﬀer over the two sub-samples.
Does this depend on the diﬀerent dynamics for the debt-to-GDP ratio
implied by the SVAR estimated over the two sub-periods? In particu-
lar (1) often produces a puzzling response of interest rates to a ﬁscal
shock. Consider for example the response to an expansionary ﬁscal
shock over the ﬁrst sub-sample. The path of the debt ratio eventually
becomes explosive: how can this be reconciled with the evidence that
the estimated response of it is small and insigniﬁcant?
• impulse responses are often used to discriminate between competing
DSGE models, or to provide evidence on the stylized facts to include in
theoretical models used for policy analysis. It is obviously impossible to
compare the empirical evidence from a model that delivers an explosive
path for the debt, with the paths of variables generated by forward
looking models, since such models do not have a solution when the
debt dynamics is unstable.
We now turn to the model described in (2).
104.2 Estimating the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks in a SVAR
with debt dynamics
The identiﬁcation problem does not change when the debt level is included
in the model. Since we treat the debt-deﬁcit relationship as an identity,
the number of shocks remains the same, so that the identiﬁcation assump-
tions discussed in the previous section remain valid. Also, since there are
no parameters to be estimated in the debt-dynamics equation, (2) can be















Table 1 reports the estimated coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst and the second lags
of dt in the ﬁve equations (taxes, spending, output, inﬂation and the cost of
debt service) in the two sub-samples.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
In all equations the restriction that the two coeﬃcients are of equal mag-
nitude and of opposite sign cannot be rejected, suggesting that the ﬁve vari-
ables respond to the lagged change in the debt ratio. The last two rows in
the Table report the coeﬃcients (and their standard errors) when this re-
striction is imposed. For instance, government spending is reduced when the
lagged change in the debt ratio is positive. (dt−1 − dt−2)m e a s u r e st h eg a p
between the actual primary surplus (as a fraction of GDP) and the surplus
that would stabilize d: the magnitude of the coeﬃcient indicates that the
gap between the surplus that would stabilize the debt ratio and the actual
surplus acts as an error correction mechanism in the ﬁscal reaction function:
current expenditures are decreased when last period’s primary surplus was
below the level that would have kept the debt ratio stable.
T h er e s p o n s eo fgt to a change in the debt-ratio is signiﬁcant after 1980,
not before. Taxes do not respond signiﬁcantly to a change in the debt ratio,
however the diﬀerence between the point estimates between the two sub-
periods is close to being signiﬁcant and the response is stabilizing only after
1980. The average interest cost of the debt also depends on the gap between
11the actual surplus and the debt stabilizing surplus. This result is particularly
strong in the second sub-sample. Finally, the direct eﬀect of lags in dt on
inﬂation and output is never signiﬁcant in any of the samples.
Summing up. Before 1980 U.S. ﬁscal policy does not seem to have been
aimed at stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio: this probably reﬂects the will
of the ﬁscal authorities to reduce the debt ratio from the high initial level
inherited after World War II. Only after 1980 does ﬁscal policy become sta-
bilizing. Using the coeﬃcients estimated up to 1980 to simulate the eﬀects of
a ﬁscal policy shock is thus inappropriate, since such a shock would put the
debt ratio on a diverging path, while the coeﬃcients have been estimated on
a sample characterized by a decreasing debt ratio.
The results in Table 1 raise a question. We argued that (1) is mis-speciﬁed
because it overlooks the possibility that ﬁscal policy reacts to the level of
the debt ratio. In other words, the mis-speciﬁcation would arise from the
omission of a low-frequency variable. But according to Table 1 what matters
is the change in the debt ratio, thus a high-frequency variable. Does this
make the omission of dt irrelevant? No, for the following reason. The ﬁrst
diﬀerence of dt is itself a (non-linear) function of dt.D i ﬀerencing the debt
dynamics equation we obtain
∆dt =






the change in the debt ratio is equal to the diﬀerence between the actual
surplus-to-GDP-ratio and the ratio that would keep the debt stable—which is
a function of the level of the debt. Hence, the change in debt ratio depends
on the level of the debt via a time-varying relationship—because the ﬁrst term
on the right hand side of (4)—the ratio of the average cost of debt ﬁnancing
to nominal GDP growth—varies over time. Figure 3 shows that this time
variation is empirically relevant over the sample we consider. In other words,
our empirical model is an error correction model consistent with cointegration
between the primary surplus and the debt-stabilizing surplus.6 Therefore,
6This cointegrating relation is diﬀerent from those experimented in standard SVAR’s.
In particular, the cointegrating relation implied by (4) is diﬀerent from the cointegrating
relation between gt and tt, with a cointegrating vector (1, −1), proposed in their robustness
check by B&P. This could explain why estimating a cointegrated model, or a simple model
speciﬁed in ﬁrst diﬀerences, makes no substantial diﬀerence for the evidence reported by
12including the change in d in a VAR is virtually equivalent to augmenting the
VAR with a time-varying function of the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio, that
is indeed a slow moving variable7.
Computing impulse responses
The presence of the intertemporal budget constraint makes computing the
responses of the variables in Yt to innovations in et diﬀerent from computing
impulse responses in a standard VAR. Impulse responses comparable to those
obtained from the traditional moving average representation of a VAR can
be constructed going through the following steps:
• generate a baseline simulation for all variables by solving (3) dynam-
ically forward (this requires setting to zero all shocks for a number of
periods equal to the horizon up to which impulse responses are needed),
• generate an alternative simulation for all variables by setting to one—
just for the ﬁrst period of the simulation—the structural shock of in-
terest, and then solve dynamically forward the model up to the same
horizon used in the baseline simulation,
• compute impulse responses to the structural shocks as the diﬀerence
between the simulated values in the two steps above. (Note that these
steps, if applied to a standard VAR, would produce standard impulse
responses. In our case they produce impulse responses that allow for
both the feedback from dt−i to Yt and for the debt dynamics),
• compute conﬁdence intervals.8
B&P. Of course, if the debt stabilizing surplus were stationary, the data would support—up
to a logarithmic transformation—the cointegrating vector in B&P, but the long-run solution
of their cointegrating system would still be diﬀerent from the one implied by a system in
which there is tight relation between the actual surplus and the debt stabilizing surplus.
The cointegrating relation implied by (4) is also diﬀerent from the error correction model
proposed in Bohn (1988): Bohn includes the level of the debt ratio in the ﬁscal reaction
function but does so without allowing for the time variation of the coeﬃcient multiplying
the debt level.
7As a robustness check we have re-run our SVAR augmenting it with the debt stabi-
lizing surplus-to-GDP ratio lagged once and twice. The coeﬃcients on the two lags where
equaly signed and their sum was not statistically diﬀerent from the coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst
diﬀerence of d, our proposed model.
8Bootstrapping requires saving the residualsf r o mt h ee s t i m a t e dV A Ra n dt h e ni t e r a t i n g
13We now turn to the results.
Debt dynamics in a model with feedbacks
Figure 4 reports out-sample simulations of dt obtained from (2). In the
second sub-sample, allowing Yt to respond to past debt growth stabilizes the
path of dt.T h i si sn o tt h ec a s ei nt h eﬁrst sub-sample—not surprisingly, since
we have found, in Table 1, that the feedbacks from dt to gt and tt only start
being signiﬁcant after 1980.
Thus omitting a feedback from the debt level to ﬁscal policy can result
in impulse responses to ﬁscal shocks that are based on biased estimates and
are computed along implausible paths for the debt ratio. Whether including
such a feedback is suﬃcient to produce stable debt paths obviously depends
on the size of the feedbacks. If they are too small—as they were in the U.S.
up to the early 1980’s—unstable paths will not be eliminated.
The eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks in a model with feedbacks
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 compare the impulse responses obtained from (2) with
those obtained in a SVAR without a debt feedback. In both cases we use
the same identifying assumptions. Figure 5.1 refers to the ﬁrst sub-sample,
1960:1-1979:4; Figure 5.2 to the later period. In each ﬁgure the left-hand
panels refer to a one percent shock to g; the right-hand side panels refer
to an equivalent shock to t. In each column the graphs show, from top to
bottom, the impulse response of g, t, y,i n ﬂation, and the average cost of
debt service. The reported conﬁdence bounds are for the impulse responses
without a debt feedback.
Pre-1980, when ﬁscal policy does not respond to d
• following a positive shock to g, allowing for a debt feedback results
in a larger response of interest rates and inﬂation (outside the 95%
conﬁdence bounds). For interest rates the divergence widens over time,
as debt accumulates,
the following steps: a) re-sample from the saved residuals and generate a set of observation
for Yt and dt, b) estimate the VAR and identify strucutral shocks, c) compute impulse
responses going thorough the steps described in the text, d) go back to step 1. By going
thorugh 1,000 iterations we produce bootstrapped distributions for impulse responses and
compute conﬁdence intervals.
14• following a positive shock to t, interest rates fall more in the model
with feedbacks and the diﬀerence also widens over time,
• the output eﬀects of shocks to g and t are larger in the model with a
debt feedback.
Post-1980, when ﬁscal policy is stabilizing
• following positive t shock output rises. In the model without a debt
feedback the eﬀect on output of a shock to t is never statistically signif-
icant. The larger increase in output in the model with a debt feedback
is partly explained by the response of spending to a tax shock: g ini-
tially falls as taxes rise, but eventually it rises—a feature of the stability
of ﬁscal policy in this sub-sample,
• g shocks are less persistent in the model with a feedback and t responds
oﬀsetting g shocks—again a feature of stability,
• the response of interest rates to a positive g shock is still negative at
the beginning, but rises over time in the presence of a feedback,
• following a shock to t interest rates rise more in the presence of a
feedback, mirroring the larger increase in y.
Table 2 complements the result in Figures 5 by computing the cumulative
response of interest rates and output to a ﬁscal shock over three horizons, (4,
12 and 20 quarters) and comparing them with the responses in the absence
of a debt feedback. The eﬀect of a 1% g shock on interest rates, cumulated
over 20 quarters, in the ﬁrst sub-sample, is 0.118 in the model with feed-
back, 0.032 without: the larger reaction of interest rates to a ﬁscal shock is
consistent with the ﬁnding that in the ﬁrst sub-sample ﬁscal policy is not
stabilizing. This is conﬁrmed by the observation that the diﬀerences in the
cumulated responses of interest rates vanish in the second sub-sample where
ﬁscal policy is stabilizing. The expansionary eﬀect of a tax increase in the
second-subsample is conﬁrmed by the cumulated responses. Following a 1%
increase in taxes output rises (over a 20 quarters horizon) by 0.288 in the
model with feedback, as opposed to 0.170 in the model without a feedback.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
155F i s c a l s h o c k s i d e n t i ﬁed from the narrative
record
Romer and Romer (2007) (R&R in what follows) use the U.S. narrative
record—presidential speeches, executive-branch documents, and Congressional
reports—to classify the size (deﬁned as the estimated revenue eﬀect of a new
tax bill), timing, and principal motivation for all major postwar tax policy
actions.9 They then identify, among all documented tax actions, those that
could be classiﬁed as ”exogenous”, as opposed to those that were counter-
cyclical, i.e. motivated by a desire to return output growth to normal. Ex-
ogenous tax changes are further divided into two groups: those that appear
to be motivated by a desire to raise the potential growth rate of the econ-
omy, and those aimed at reducing a budget deﬁcit inherited from previous
administrations.
Since 1947 U.S. Federal laws changed taxes in 82 quarters. A number
of these quarters had tax changes of multiple types. Among the 104 sepa-
rate quarterly tax changes identiﬁed, 65 are classiﬁed as exogenous. In this
Section we use these 65 tax changes (the R&R exogenous tax shocks) and
ask what diﬀerence it makes if the debt channel is, or is not, included in the
transmission mechanism.
R&R estimate the impact of tax shocks on output using a single-equation
approach:










γjZt−j + et (5)
where ∆yt is real quarterly output growth,
∆Tex
t−1
Yt−1 are the tax shocks,
measured as a percent of nominal GDP, and Zt−j are controls (lags of ∆yt,
monetary policy shocks, government spending, oil prices). The Z0s are as-
sumed to be exogenous, and in particular unaﬀected by the tax shocks, not
even with a lag. The R&R exercise should thus be interpreted as asking the
following (hypothetical) question: Assume that the transmission mechanism
9Early attempts at applying to ﬁscal policy the methodology proposed by Romer and
Romer (1989) to identify monetary policy shocks were Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher
(1999), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), Ramey (2006). These papers used a
dummy variable which identiﬁes characterizes episodes of signiﬁcant and exogenous in-
creases in government spending (typically wars).
16o ft a xs h o c k si ss h u td o w na n dt h a ts u c hs h o c k so n l ya ﬀect output directly,
rather than, for instance, also via their eﬀe c to ni n t e r e s tr a t e s .W h a ti st h e i r
eﬀect on output under this hypothesis? R&R ﬁnd that ”exogenous” tax in-
creases have a larger negative eﬀect on output than countercyclical tax hikes.
Among the exogenous tax increases, those motivated by the aim to rein in a
budget deﬁcit are less contractionary.—in fact the negative impact on output
is statistically insigniﬁcant.
To estimate the eﬀects of the R&R tax shocks when ﬁscal policy is allowed
to respond to the level of the debt we ﬁrst need to embed these shocks in a
model that doesn’t shut down the transmission mechanism. We do this using
the R&R shocks in the two VAR’s analyzed above: (1) and (2).10 Therefore,


























where the variables in Y are, as before, taxes, government spending,
output, inﬂation and interest rates.
Including the R&R tax shocks in a VAR is a natural way of computing
the dynamic response of macro variables to shocks identiﬁed outside the VAR
because what matters are the impulse responses generated by the diﬀerent
shocks, not the correlation of the shocks themselves. 11 The R&R shocks are
valid shocks to taxes because we ﬁnd that they are uncorrelated with all lags
of the variables included in the VAR’s and are signiﬁcant only in the equation
10R&R scale their shocks by the level of GDP. We scale them by taxes to allow direct
comparability of the eﬀects of these shocks with those identiﬁed in a SVAR. In a SVAR tax
shocks are extracted from a speciﬁcation in the logarithms of the levels of real variables.
Innovations thus have the dimension of a percentage change in taxes. A one per cent
change in taxes is much smaller than a one per cent shock in the tax-to-GDP ratio. The
re-scaling aﬀe c t st h es i z eo ft h ee ﬀects but not the shape of the impulse responses.
11VAR’s have been used to compute impulse responses to shocks identiﬁed outside the
VAR in the analysis of the eﬀects of monetary shocks in Bagliano and Favero (1999).
17for t. Thus they satisfy the properties that exogenous shocks identiﬁed in a
structural VAR should fulﬁll.
Figure 6 shows the impulse response of output to an exogenous R&R tax
shock equivalent to 1% of taxes. Impulse responses are computed using
three diﬀerent models:







• (6), a VAR that excludes a debt feedback
• (7), a model that allows the variables in the VAR to respond to the
level of the debt.
The R&R shocks start in 1947, while our data, for the reasons noted in
footnote 2, only start in 1950:1: we thus miss the exogenous shocks that
occurred between January 1947 and December 1949. As in the previous
Section we split the sample in two parts: 1950:1-1979:4 and 1980:1-2006:2.
The eﬀects on output of the exogenous R&R tax shocks are quite diﬀerent
in the two sub-samples and depending on the model they are embedded in.
In the ﬁrst sub-sample (1950:1-1979:4) the contractionary. eﬀect of a tax
hike is larger when Z is endogenized in a model that includes the level of the
debt and the government intertemporal budget constraint. This probably
happens because—as documented in the previous Section—debt stabilization
does not appear to have been a concern for the U.S. ﬁscal authorities in the
ﬁrst part of the sample. A tax increase thus did not call for a compensating
change in the budget. Fiscal shocks could cumulate over time amplifying the
eﬀect on output of an initial shock. This may explain why tax hikes have
larger eﬀects in the models that allow the variables in Z to respond to the
shock.
In the second sub-sample, when ﬁscal policy becomes stabilizing–-a pos-
itive shock to taxes is compensated by a subsequent ﬁscal accommodation.
This explains why, analyzing the eﬀe c t so fs h o c k si nam o d e lw h e r eZ is en-
dogenous and ﬁscal policy responds to the debt level, produces much smaller
output eﬀects compared with the R&R single equation model. Figure 7
shows that in fact, in the second sub-sample, an initial positive tax shock
is accompanied by further tax changes in the opposite direction. Following
the initial shock taxes fall: when this happens the eﬀect on the budget is
18compensated by increases in spending. These responses are not captured in
(5) because the equation sets to zero the dynamic response of all variables,
with the only exception of output growth, to tax shocks.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have analyzed the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks allowing for a direct response
of taxes, government spending and the cost of debt service to the level of
t h ep u b l i cd e b t( a sar a t i ot oG D P ) .W eh a v es h o w nt h a to m i t t i n gs u c h
a feedback can result in incorrect estimates of the dynamic eﬀects of ﬁscal
shocks. We suggested in particular that the absence of an eﬀect of ﬁscal
shocks on long-term interest rates—a frequent ﬁnding in research based on
Vector Autoregressions that omit a debt feedback and do not endogenize
debt dynamics—can be explained by their mis-speciﬁcation, especially over
samples in which the debt dynamics appears to be unstable.
The methodology described in this paper to analyze the impact of ﬁscal
shocks by taking into account the stock-ﬂow relationship between debt and
ﬁscal variables could be extended to other dynamic models which include
similar identities. For instance, the recent discussions on the importance of
including capital as a slow-moving variable to capture the relation between
productivity shocks and hours worked (see e.g. Christiano et al, 2005 and
Chari et al. 2005) could beneﬁt from an estimation technique that tracks
the dynamics of the capital stock generated by the relevant shocks. The
same applies to open economy models that study, for instance, the eﬀects
of a productivity shock on the current account (see e.g. Corsetti et al.,
2006) and that typically omit a feedbackf r o mt h es t o c ko fe x t e r n a ld e b to n
macroeconomic variables.
This approach could also be used in the analysis of the eﬀects of ﬁscal
shocks on debt sustainability, an issue which cannot be addressed in the
context of a VAR that fails to keep track of the debt dynamics. Stochastic
simulations of (2) could also be used to evaluate the sustainability of current
systematic ﬁscal policy and to compute the risk of an unstable debt dynamics
implied by the current policy regime.
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Figure 1: Actual (DY) and simulated (DY I) (dynamically backward and
forward starting in 1970:1) debt-GDP ratio. Actual data are observed at
quarterly frequency from 1970 onwards and at annual frequency from 1970
backward. The simulated data are constructed using the government
intertemporal budget constraint (2) with observed data and initial










65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20 25
A c tu a l D e b t to  G D P  R a tio
S im u la te d  D e b t to  G D P  R a tio  (s m p l 1 9 6 0 -1 9 7 9 )
S im u la te d  D e b t to  G D P  R a tio  (s m p l 1 9 8 0 -2 0 0 6 )
Figure 2: Actual and simulated (out of sample) debt-to-GDP ratio starting
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Figure 4: Actual and simulated out-of sample debt-GDP dynamics
(starting from conditions in 1980:1, and in 2006:2 respectively).
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Figure 5.1: Fiscal shocks identiﬁe df r o maS V A R( d o t t e dl i n e )a n di nm o d e l
with feedbacks (solid line). Sample 1960:1 1979:4. The ﬁrst column shows
responses to shocks to gt; the second column to shocks to tt.The responses
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Figure 5.2: Fiscal shocks identiﬁe df r o maS V A R( d o t t e dl i n e )a n di nm o d e l
with feedbacks (solid line). Sample 1980:1 2006:2. The ﬁrst column shows
responses to shocks to gt; the second column to shocks to tt.The responses
reported along the rows refer, respectively, to the eﬀects on gt, tt, yt, ∆pt, it.
































Figure 7: Dynamic response of all variables to an R&R tax shock, in a VAR
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Figure A.1: Fiscal shocks identiﬁed from a SVAR::1960:1-1979:4. The ﬁrst
column shows responses to shocks to gt; the second column to shocks to
tt.The responses reported along the rows refer, respectively, to the eﬀects
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Figure A.2: Fiscal shocks identiﬁed from a SVAR: 1980:1 2006:2. The ﬁrst
column shows responses to shocks to gt; the second column to shocks to
tt.The responses reported along the rows refer, respectively, to the eﬀects
on gt, tt, yt, ∆pt, it.
30Table 1 Feedbacks from dt−i (st. errors in parenthesis)






























































Cumulative responses of y and i to a g and a t shock
Cumulative responses (annualized) to g and t shocks equal to 1 per cent
(annualized). Bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals in brackets
Horizon without debt feedback with debt feedback
quarters 60:1-79:4 80:1-06:2 60:1-79:4 80:1-06:2 60:1-79:4 80:1-06:2 60:1-79:4 80:1-06:2
g shock t shock g shock t shock
yt 40 .073
(0.005 0.12)
0.164
(0.12 0.19)
−0.231
(−0.32 −0.14)
−0.004
(−0.08 0.06)
0.056
(−0.013 0.11)
0.127
(0.077 0.16)
−0.249
(−0.35 −0.16)
0.016
(−0.07 0.06)
12 0.440
(0.17 0.60)
0.805
(0.55 0.84)
−0.987
(−1.25 −0.55)
0.170
(−0.13 0.38)
0.463
(0.10 0.58)
0.712
(0.48 0.75)
−0.994
(−1.31 −0.59)
0.288
(−0.18 0.34)
20 0.585
(0.06 0.85)
1.431
(0.95 1.50)
−1.577
(−2.03 −0.83)
0.272
(−0.46 0.65)
0.475
(−0.12 0.73)
1.280
(0.77 .1.31)
−1.590
(−2.11 −0.86)
0.654
(−0.48 0.57)
it 4 −0.004
(−0.02 0.007)
−0.045
(−0.07 −.0.02)
0.003
(−0.01 0.013)
0.011
(−0.005 0.02)
−0.009
(−0.02 0.001)
−0.056
(−0.07 −.0.04)
−0.007
(−0.02 0.002)
0.016
(0.002 0.02)
12 −0.010
(−0.05 0.05)
−0.141
(−0.20 −0.08)
−0.013
(−0.06 0.05)
0.058
(0.004 0.10)
0.022
(0.001 0.52)
−0.161
(−0.20 −0.09)
−0.075
(−0.10 −0.34)
0.081
(0.02 0.11)
20 0.032
(−0.02 −0.10)
−0.232
(−0.32 −0.14)
−0.054
(−0.13 0.03)
0.125
(0.03 0.15)
0.118
(0.04 0.13)
−0.212
(−0.29 −0.13)
−0.205
(−0.26 −0.11)
0.160
(0.03 0.18)